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 Abstract 
The systems of direct taxes and cash benefits in the Member States of the European Union 
vary considerably in size and structure. We explore their direct impacts on cross-sectional 
income inequality (termed "redistributive effect" for the purpose of this paper) using 
EUROMOD, a tax-benefit microsimulation model for the European Union. This relies on 
harmonised household micro-data representative of each national population together with 
simulations of entitlements to cash benefits and liabilities for taxes and social contributions. It 
allows us to draw a more comprehensive – and comparable – picture of the combined effects 
of transfers and taxes than is usually possible. We decompose the redistributive effect of tax-
benefit systems to assess and compare the effectiveness of individual policies at reducing 
income disparities. We derive results for the 15 "old" members of the European Union and 
present them for each country separately as well as for the EU-15 as a whole. 
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 Household incomes and redistribution in the European Union: 
quantifying the equalising properties of taxes and benefits
1 
 
Introduction 
Taxes and social benefits affect household income through several different channels and 
these effects can be assessed in a number of different ways. This paper focuses on the 
influence of social and fiscal policies on income inequality. In particular, we analyse how tax 
and benefit payments alter the distribution of household incomes in the European Union. Our 
aim is to provide evidence on the effectiveness of a wide range of different policy 
configurations at reducing disparities of household resources. 
The novelty of the analysis is that it encompasses both taxes and benefits and that it is 
undertaken for all 15 ‘old’ member countries of the EU. We employ a microsimulation 
approach, which allows us to address better some of the measurement problems normally 
encountered in comparative research on income inequality. Results are conceptually 
consistent and comparable across countries so that, in addition to country-specific results, 
inequality measures can be reported for the EU-15 as a whole. We analyse separately the 
distributive properties of different types of tax-benefit instruments, including income taxes, 
social contributions, public pensions as well as other non means-tested and means-tested 
benefits.  
While the scope of this paper is wider than that of most previous studies, it shares a number of 
relevant conceptual choices. Two of them are worth noting in particular. First of all, taxes and 
benefit payments are assessed in terms of their direct impact on household resources. 
Focussing on observable tax and benefit payments in this way does, of course, provide a 
partial measure of how transfers between households and governments affect incomes (see 
Boadway and Keen, 2000) and this needs to be kept in mind when interpreting results and 
comparing them across countries. On the one hand, the existence of taxes and benefits 
                                                           
1 Acknowledgements: This paper was written as part of the MICRESA (Micro Level Analysis of the European 
Social Agenda) project, financed by the Improving Human Potential programme of the European Commission 
(SERD-2001-00099).  We are indebted to all past and current members of the EUROMOD consortium and to 
Stephen Jenkins and Panos Tsakloglou for helpful comments on early drafts. The views expressed in this paper, 
as well as any errors, are the responsibilities of the authors and do not implicate the institutions to which they are 
affiliated. In particular, this applies to the interpretation of model results and any errors in its use. EUROMOD is 
continually being improved and updated and the results presented here represent work in progress. 
EUROMOD relies on micro-data from twelve different sources for fifteen countries. These are the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) User Data Base made available by Eurostat; the Austrian version of the 
ECHP made available by the Interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative Research in the Social Sciences; the Panel 
Survey on Belgian Households (PSBH) made available by the University of Liège and the University of 
Antwerp; the Income Distribution Survey made available by Statistics Finland; the Enquête sur les Budgets 
Familiaux (EBF) made available by INSEE; the public use version of the German Socio Economic Panel Study 
(GSOEP) made available by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin; the Living in Ireland 
Survey made available by the Economic and Social Research Institute; the Survey of Household Income and 
Wealth (SHIW95) made available by the Bank of Italy; the Socio-Economic Panel for Luxembourg (PSELL-2) 
made available by CEPS/INSTEAD; the Socio-Economic Panel Survey (SEP) made available by Statistics 
Netherlands through the mediation of the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research - Scientific Statistical 
Agency; the Income Distribution Survey made available by Statistics Sweden; and the Family Expenditure 
Survey (FES), made available by the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) through the Data Archive. 
Material from the FES is Crown Copyright and is used by permission. Neither the ONS nor the Data Archive 
bears any responsibility for the analysis or interpretation of the data reported here. An equivalent disclaimer 
applies for all other data sources and their respective providers cited in this acknowledgement. 
 
  1generally causes changes in both market prices and household behaviour and therefore has an 
influence on pre tax-benefit market incomes (and economic welfare) which is not captured by 
looking at the amounts of taxes and benefits alone. On the other hand, in-kind transfers (to 
individual households or provided as collective goods and services) represent a significant 
portion of the resources transferred from governments to households. 
Secondly, we measure incomes and inequality at a particular point in time. The analysis is 
therefore  static and does not attempt to measure the distribution of lifetime incomes or 
separate the “within-cohort” and “between-cohort” components of cross-sectional inequality. 
This point is relevant because some of the tax-benefit instruments analysed here (pensions and 
other contingency- or insurance-based benefits as well as the taxes earmarked to finance 
them) are largely designed to redistribute across the life-cycle rather than across individuals. 
However, while the long-term or dynamic aspects of inequality are clearly of interest, the 
same is true for disparities observed at any given point in time. Policy instruments that are 
designed to redistribute inter-temporally can, as shown here, also have important 
consequences for cross-sectional inequality. Indeed, the perceived impact on the distribution 
of current incomes can have important implications for the political feasibility of introducing 
these measures in the first place. In addition, the extent of income disparities at any given 
point in time is a measure of the effectiveness of social policies providing financial assistance 
subject to certain contingencies. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 1 provides some background by 
describing previous methods and existing sources of data for making international 
comparisons of the redistributive properties of tax and/or benefit systems. The advantages of 
using microsimulation methods are explained and section 2 goes on to describe in more detail 
the method, and the European model, EUROMOD. Section 3 introduces some of the key 
issues to be addressed when comparing redistributive effects across different underlying 
populations and introduces the definitions and assumptions to be used in the analysis which 
follows. The results are presented in three stages. The first, in section 4.1, illustrates the extent 
to which the components of tax and benefit systems vary in their importance across countries 
and according to the level of household disposable income. This is followed in section 4.2 by 
an analysis which shows that inequality before the operation of taxes and benefits varies less 
across the countries considered than it does after they take effect. It also shows how the 
relative equalising effects of the tax and benefit systems as a whole depend on whether public 
pensions are considered as part of the redistributive system. Finally, section 4.3 considers the 
redistributive roles of sub-components of the tax-benefit systems, focussing particularly on 
the contrasting effects of means-tested and non means-tested benefits. Section 5 concludes.  
 
1.  Sources and methods for the assessment and comparison of redistribution 
International comparisons of social policies are often made using calculations based on model 
families (see e.g. Eardley, et al., 1996; OECD, 2004) or macro indicators (e.g. share of social 
expenditures in GDP). While useful for understanding the structure and certain relevant 
features of complex policy measures, such studies say little about their distributional impact. 
Research based on representative micro-data is, on the other hand, often limited to one 
particular country. Comparisons of national datasets are difficult as available data are 
typically not designed to be comparable across countries (see, for instance, Smeeding and 
Grodner, 2000). International studies relying on these data – which can for instance differ in 
terms of population coverage, unit of analysis or the definition of individual income 
components – are then subject to these limitations (e.g. Burniaux, et al., 1998; Deleeck, et al., 
1992). 
  2In a recent study covering 27 OECD countries, Förster and Mira d’Ercole (2005) report 
household income inequality before and after taxes and social benefits. The analysis is based 
on indicators provided by individual country experts and is based on different types of micro-
data. Standardised terms of reference are used to ensure consistency of concepts and 
definitions but due to the different data sources, comparability across countries is necessarily 
limited. Hence, Förster and Mira d’Ercole focus specifically on changes of income inequality 
over time and how the observed longitudinal patterns differ internationally. Several 
international studies of the redistributive effects of taxes also use country-specific data.
2 They 
ignore the role of social benefits, however, and generally also do not consider tax-like 
payments such as compulsory social contributions. Where a large number of countries are 
covered, results tend to be based on a mix of administrative data and different types of survey 
sources. As a result, the populations that these data represent differ between countries. In 
addition, the unit of analysis is often dictated by data collection methods and can therefore 
vary between countries as well. For instance household income, which is widely accepted as 
the appropriate measure of monetary well-being (Canberra Group, 2001), cannot be analysed 
where tax data do not contain information on the incomes of all household members. 
Comparative research on income inequality has been greatly helped by efforts to harmonise 
national data sets ex-post (Luxembourg Income Study, LIS) and by prioritising comparability 
in the context of newly designed multi-country data collection activities, especially in the 
European Union (ECHP and SILC).
3 Atkinson et al. (1995) use LIS data for a comparison of 
income inequality in OECD countries. Results are also available from later waves of LIS data 
(Smeeding and Grodner, 2000). The ex-post harmonisation of the LIS data does, however, 
present some problems when analysing the redistributive effects of tax and benefit policies. 
Notably, the quality and level of detail of information about taxes paid vary considerably 
across countries. Researchers using the European Community Household Panel have to 
confront similar issues. While data are more detailed than LIS in some respects (more 
information is, for instance, provided separately for each household member), income 
variables tend to be more aggregated across sources of income. Most importantly, incomes are 
recorded net of taxes and information on tax liabilities is not provided. Redistribution studies 
therefore cannot consider the redistributive impact of taxes and have to focus on social 
transfers alone (e.g. Heady, et al., 2001). 
The approach used in the present paper addresses several of the problems described here and 
arguably provides more comprehensive and comparable results than previous studies. The 
main difference lies in the combination of partly harmonised micro-data with well-established 
simulation techniques. Rather than taking tax and benefit amounts directly from the data, the 
micro-data are instead used as a basis for calculating tax liabilities and benefit entitlements. 
This is done in accordance with detailed legal rules to ensure that results for each observation 
correspond as closely as possible to the taxes and benefits that would be determined by tax 
authorities and benefit agencies. For instance, income taxes are computed by first 
determining, for each taxpayer identified in the data, taxable income as well as other tax-
                                                           
2 Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2001), Wagstaff, et al. (1999). Older studies are Berglas (1971), Kakwani (1977), 
and Zandvakili (1994). A recent study uses EUROMOD to estimate redistribution and progressivity 
characteristics of personal income taxes and social contributions for 15 EU countries (Verbist, 2004). 
O’Donoghue et al. (2004) make use of EUROMOD to consider redistribution of taxes and social benefits in the 
EU15, with a primary focus on the role of indirect taxes. 
3 For the member states of European Union (EU) the European Household Community Panel (ECHP) was 
established in the 1990s. See Eurostat (1996) for details on the methodology. The final wave of the ECHP was 
collected in 2001 and its successor, the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC), is planned to provide 
data from 2004 onwards. For some countries doubts have been expressed about the accuracy of the ECHP data 
(see e.g. Cantillon et al., 2003; Peracchi, 2002). 
  3relevant circumstances (employment status, number of children, etc.) and then applying legal 
income tax rules in order to find resulting tax liabilities. 
Given limited information in available micro-data on detailed tax and benefit amounts, tax-
benefit microsimulation models generally provide a richer basis for assessing the distributive 
impact of taxes and benefits. The most obvious advantage of this approach is that it permits 
an analysis of taxes and benefits based on datasets that do not provide information on these 
variables at all, or not with the desired level of detail.
4 Moreover, the simulation approach is 
particularly attractive in a comparative setting as it makes the analysis of taxes and benefits 
less dependent on the precise definition of these target variables, and less influenced by 
differences in these definitions across countries. By ensuring a consistent application of legal 
policy rules across countries, the resulting tax and benefit amounts are potentially more 
comparable than tax and benefit variables recorded in the micro-data itself. Finally, the 
simulation approach provides greater analytical flexibility as it allows categories of taxes and 
benefits to be defined consistently across countries and independently of definitions adopted 
by the data providers. While some countries have a long tradition of using microsimulation 
models for these types of analysis (e.g. Duclos, 1993), a conceptually consistent comparison 
across countries has so far been inhibited by the lack of suitable multi-country tax-benefit 
models. 
 
2.  Tax-benefit models and EUROMOD 
A microsimulation model is a representation of a socio-economic reality aiming, among other 
things, to gain insights into the functioning of existing policies as well as the consequences of 
proposed policy changes (Krupp, 1986; Atkinson and Sutherland, 1988). Tax-benefit models 
(or “static” microsimulation models) are based on household micro-data from representative 
sources. They calculate disposable income for each household in the dataset. This calculation 
is made up of elements of income taken from the underlying micro-data (e.g. employee 
earnings) combined with components that are simulated by the model (taxes and benefits). 
The main advantages of such a microsimulation model is that it allows one to focus quite 
accurately on the objectives of social and economic policy, on the instruments employed, and 
on the precise change experienced by those to whom the measures apply. Regulations are 
incorporated into the model as accurately as possible, so that the impact on each unit (person, 
family, household) is identified. A particular advantage of this method is that it allows for the 
study of a set of policy measures from two distinct perspectives. On the one hand, one can 
focus on the net, cumulative effect of the various policy instruments, and therefore also on the 
impact of the entire set of transfer-oriented measures. On the other hand, a microsimulation 
model offers the possibility of dissecting complex measures (e.g. through a step-by-step tax 
calculation for a household), so that the impact of each step may be considered separately. 
The level of aggregation – both across units of analysis and across income components - may 
be chosen according to the question being posed.  
All simulation models have inherent limitations. Most of them use empirical data that are 
obtained either from surveys or from administrative sources. As such, the accuracy of the 
results depends on the quality of the data. Generally these data do not refer to the period of 
interest and must be updated in some way, a process which is inherently prone to some error.  
Factors affecting the administrative effectiveness of tax and benefit systems cannot be 
                                                           
4 For example, in an analysis of the redistributive characteristics of income taxes, Wagstaff et al. (1999) use 
simulated income tax amounts for a sub-set of the countries analysed. 
  4captured precisely, meaning that the non- take-up of benefits and tax evasion may not be fully 
accounted for and are typically not accounted for at all.  
In this paper we use EUROMOD, the static tax-benefit model covering the 15 Member States 
of the pre-May 2004 European Union.
5 It represents a concerted attempt to reduce the lack of 
comparability across datasets and to apply a consistent modelling strategy to these data. 
EUROMOD provides measures of direct taxes, social contributions and cash benefits, where 
benefits may be categorised according to function or other characteristics. The datasets used 
as the basis for the simulations in this paper are listed in Annex A. They were chosen on the 
grounds that they provide the best quality input for a tax-benefit model and are at the same 
time available and accessible to an international scientific project. Although they include data 
collected at various points in time 1993-1999, they have all been adjusted to 1998 prices and 
incomes and the policies simulated are those prevailing in mid-1998.  
All benefits and taxes are computed based on the assumption that the legal rules apply and 
that the costs of compliance are zero. They do not take account of any non-take up of benefits 
or tax evasion that may occur in practice. In some countries EUROMOD is known to over-
estimate taxes collected (e.g. Greece) and in others it over-estimates the amount of means-
tested benefits paid (e.g. UK and Ireland and to some extent in Germany and Sweden). This is 
obviously more of an issue in countries that rely more heavily on these types of instrument. 
Mantovani and Sutherland (2003) provide a detailed assessment of the factors affecting the 
reliability of EUROMOD estimates of household disposable income.
6  
 
3.  Measuring inequality and redistribution 
We use a range of standard measures in order to explore the direct effects of tax and benefit 
payments on income inequality. For the purpose of this paper, and following common usage 
of the term in the literature, the reduction of inequality achieved by the tax-benefit system as a 
whole (or of individual components) is termed “redistribution” or “redistributive effect” 
which is therefore used synonymously with “equalising effect”. It is worth emphasising that 
redistribution in this sense does not require anybody to be better off. A pareto-worsening 
policy measure (a progressive tax on everybody) thus constitutes “redistribution” in the 
technical sense of the term even before any of the tax revenues are redistributed in the form of 
transfers or collective goods or services. 
                                                           
5 See Immervoll, et al. (1999), Sutherland (2000) and http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod  for more 
information and access to EUROMOD Working Papers. 
6 Notable differences across countries in the underlying data sources that should be borne in mind when 
interpreting results include (a) for Sweden income is aggregated over the narrow family unit (single person or 
couple plus children aged under 18. i.e., individuals aged 18 or more are all treated as not living with their 
parents) whereas for other countries the data allow us to adopt a wider household definition – all people living in 
one dwelling and sharing some of the costs of living. Also for Sweden, income from capital gains is included, as 
are the incomes of people living for part of the year. These differences relative to the calculations for other 
countries are likely to lead to higher measured inequality in Sweden. Indeed, Comparison with estimates from 
the Swedish Ministry of Finance confirm that the Gini measure is sensitive to both household definition and 
inclusion of capital gains. If a comprehensive household definition were used and capital gains were excluded, 
these numbers suggest that the Gini coefficient would be lower by about 6 to 7 points. In future analysis, it is 
planned to show inequality measures using this latter definition. (b) The reference time period for incomes for 
most countries is one year, but for Ireland and the UK it is shorter (a month or a week for most sources of 
income). Detailed descriptions of the structure of tax-benefit systems as well as validations of EUROMOD 
results against available external statistics in each country can be found in individual “country reports” on the 
web-site   http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod/countries. 
  5In this paper, income redistribution is measured in relation to the standard Gini coefficient.
7 In 
particular, the redistributive effect, RE of taxes and/or benefits (TB) is measured as the 
difference between the Gini coefficients of income before (GX) and after taxes and/or benefits 
(GX+TB).  
  TB X X G G RE + − =     
Since measuring the redistributive effect of a policy instrument involves a comparison of 
incomes before and after this instrument, it is evident that redistribution measures are 
sensitive to the definition of the “base” or “pre-instrument” income (X in our notation). For 
example, the redistributive effect of an income tax can differ significantly from what one 
might expect if pre tax and transfer market income is used as X. Since some benefits may be 
taxable, individuals with zero market income can have positive tax liabilities. As a result, 
income taxes will seem less redistributive if market income is taken as the base than if all of 
taxable income is the starting point. 
One implication of this is that the assumed sequence of different instruments matters when 
decomposing the redistributive effect of the entire tax-benefit system into the contribution of 
each individual tax and benefit. Obviously, studies looking at only one type of instrument 
(e.g. taxes) do not encounter this problem. Given the wider scope of the present paper we do, 
however, have to make a decision on the appropriate sequence. Unfortunately, choosing any 
particular sequence would be arbitrary to some extent since different sequences will generally 
be appropriate in each country (for instance, means-tested benefits can be taxable in some 
countries but may depend on after-tax income in others). Any particular choice would be hard 
to justify and we therefore do not attempt to decompose effects of all tax benefit instruments 
simultaneously. Instead, we investigate the equalising properties of different types of 
instrument by focussing on one instrument at a time. Rather than assessing the contribution of 
each type of tax or benefit to the overall effect of the tax-benefit system, we ask for each type 
of tax and benefit: starting from a situation where this instrument does not exist, what are the 
distributive effects of introducing it? Hence, we measure the redistributive effect of individual 
taxes and benefits by comparing disposable income after all taxes and benefits (X+TB in the 
above notation) with disposable income minus the effect of the instrument of interest (X). 
We exploit EUROMOD’s capacity to identify individual taxes and benefits in order to explore 
the contribution of each main component of tax-benefit systems to redistribution. We use two 
different definitions of “base” or “pre tax-benefit” income as our starting points. One is 
“market income” as conventionally defined. This includes gross earnings (pre-tax and not 
including employer social contributions), self-employment income and income from capital 
plus private pensions and transfers from other households. The second starting point also 
includes income from public pensions. This dual perspective is taken for two reasons. First, 
one can argue that public pension income is not properly part of the redistributive system and 
should be considered as deferred earnings or compulsory savings. This applies particularly to 
insurance-based systems.  
The second reason is more pragmatic. In some countries private pensions substitute for public 
pensions. This occurs under varying degrees of regulation, compulsion and state subsidy, and 
to varying extents. Drawing the line between “public” and private” is difficult. Our data do 
not allow us to identify private pension income with any precision and so this, together with 
                                                           
7 The standard Gini indicator represents one of many possible approaches for aggregating observed income 
inequalities into one overall measure (using the same weight for each observation regardless of income level. See 
Donaldson and Weymark, 1980 and Yitzhaki, 1983). A planned extension of this paper will use the generalised 
version of the Gini index to explore the sensitivity of results to alternative weighting schemes giving, for 
instance, more weight to inequalities at lower income levels. 
  6other income from capital, is included in market income under both starting points. For 
reasons of comparability the second starting point treats public pensions in the same way.  
The transformation of market income to disposable income is defined in the following steps: 
   (1) market income  
+   (2) state pensions 
+   (3) non means-tested benefits 
+   (4) means-tested benefits 
-  (5) employee and self-employed social insurance contributions 
-  (6) income taxes 
=   (7) disposable income 
 
The first of our two starting points is market income (1) and the second is after the addition of 
public pension income (2). Public pension income is defined to be restricted to those aged 65 
or more and to benefits specifically intended to provide income during old age or to replace 
earnings during retirement. Any other pensions paid to younger people or other benefits paid 
to the elderly are included in one or other of the cash benefit categories (3) or (4) rather than 
as pension income. Cash benefits have been sub-divided into those that are means-tested – 
designed to redistribute to low income individuals or households – and those that are not 
specifically targeted by income (or assets). In practice in some cases the distinction can be 
somewhat arbitrary, especially where a means test applies to a relatively minor top-up 
component of a more general benefit. Annex B discusses these definitions in more detail and 
lists the income components that are considered to be “pension” and “means-tested” benefits 
in each country. Remaining cash benefits are classified as non means-tested benefits (3).   
Employee and self-employed social contributions are deducted (5) as are direct taxes - mainly 
income taxes, but also including other direct, personal taxes that exist in some countries – 
(6).
8 This results in disposable income (7).  
Throughout, income is aggregated across household members. When comparing average 
incomes across countries (as in section 4.1) income is aggregated across all (weighted) 
households, without adjustment for household size and composition. All distributional 
analysis is conducted at the person level, allocating household income and its components to 
each person in the household. For this purpose, incomes and income components are 
equivalised using the modified OECD scale.
9 Statistics for EU15 are constructed applying 
population weights and adjusting income for differences in purchasing power across 
countries.
10 
 
                                                           
8 Arguably, when adopting the starting point which includes public pension income in market income, the 
element of social contributions that covers pensions should also be deducted from market income rather then 
being considered as part of the redistributive system. This is not done in this version of the paper because of the 
difficulty in some countries in assigning a component of contributions to pensions.  
9 This assigns a weight of 1 to the household head, weights of 0.5 to every other adult in the household and 0.3 to 
each child (person aged below 14) in the household. 
10 Incomes in Euro are divided by the OECD purchasing power adjustment factors for GDP as follows: AT: 
0.9401, BE: 0.9304, DK: 1.1369, FI: 0.9718, FR: 0.9284, GE: 1.0057, GR: 0.6652, IR: 0.8734, IT: 0.8019, LU: 
1.0112, NL: 0.9103, PT: 0.6467, SP: 0.7344, SW: 1.0756, UK: 0.9341. For Denmark, Sweden and the UK 
respectively the following Euro exchange rates are used: 7.511, 8.807, 0.6783. 
 
  74. Results   
This section considers in turn 
(a) The size of the various components of the redistributive systems. The picture for average 
households is contrasted with that for the bottom and top quintiles. 
(b) Income inequality and the redistributive effects of tax-benefit systems as a whole using 
the two alternative “starting points” (excluding and including public pensions). 
(c) The redistributive effect of four main tax-benefit components (means-tested benefits, non 
means tested benefits, social contributions and income taxes).  
 
4.1 The composition of household income across the income distribution 
First we demonstrate the extent to which each income source varies in size across countries. 
Figure 1 shows the composition of disposable income in terms of market income, income 
taxes, social contributions and the three categories of benefits and public pensions that we 
consider. Incomes are not equivalised and are measured per household rather than across 
persons. This gives a “budgetary” perspective rather than a welfare perspective to the overall 
redistributive mechanisms. Nevertheless, it is important to note that these estimates should not 
be interpreted in terms of budget deficits or surpluses, as major parts of government revenue 
(e.g. employer contributions, indirect taxes, corporate taxes) and spending (in-kind benefits, 
spending on public services) are not included. One way of interpreting the information in 
Figure 1 is as showing the composition of 100 euro of disposable income. How much market 
income is necessary on average to achieve this level of disposable income, and how much is 
deducted as taxes and added as benefits? 
For eight countries market income forms on average between 95% and 105% of disposable 
income. This means that in most countries the state "takes" about the same amount in income 
taxes and employee contributions
11 as it "gives" in cash benefits shown here. Market income 
makes up more than 105% of disposable income in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Germany and Sweden. This means that deductions from gross market incomes are 
significantly higher than the sum of all shown benefits; this is especially the case in Denmark, 
where non-cash benefits - which are not included - play an important role. Spanish and French 
households, on the other hand, receive on average notably more benefits than they pay in 
taxes, as their original income is less than 95% of disposable income.  
Public pensions form more than 15% of average disposable income in Austria, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and Sweden. On average, non means-tested benefits 
make up a much greater proportion of disposable income than means-tested benefits, except 
in the case of Ireland and the UK. On the burden side we find that income taxes are dominant 
in all countries, except France, the Netherlands and Greece where social contributions are 
relatively more important. 
Low income households 
Figure 2 shows the same information for low income households: those in the bottom quintile 
group of the distribution (defined on the basis of equivalised household disposable income at 
the person level). The situation is entirely different. In about half of the EU countries market 
income and state transfers each account for half of disposable income. Greece and Italy have a 
                                                           
11 In most countries, total employer social insurance contributions, which are not included in the calculations, are 
of a similar or greater magnitude than employee-paid contributions (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain). 
  8relatively higher share of market income (around 2/3). A considerably smaller share of market 
income is found in Belgium, Denmark, Finland and especially the UK and Ireland. In these 
latter two countries means-tested benefits form a large proportion of household income for 
those in the bottom quintile (in Ireland even more than 50%). In all other countries non 
means-tested benefits represent a larger share of household incomes than means-tested cash 
transfers, even for these low income households. Compared to average households, public 
pensions make up a larger share of household income in the bottom quintile, indicating that an 
important proportion of the low income population consists of pensioners. 
Although most income tax systems are progressive, this does not mean that people with low 
incomes pay no taxes. Especially in Denmark and Sweden, the tax burden for the bottom 
quintile is relatively high. In the Netherlands they pay rather high social contributions; this 
follows from the fact that the Dutch also pay contributions on pensions and on an important 
part of their other state transfers (see also Verbist, 2005). Ireland is the only country where the 
group with the lowest 20% of incomes pays virtually no taxes or contributions.
12 
High income households 
As might be expected, and as shown in Figure 3, market income is greater than 100% of 
disposable income in the top quintile (by 80% in Denmark). This is mirrored by the high level 
of taxes paid by these relatively rich households, especially in Denmark and Belgium. 
Contributions are far less important than for the average household, due to the upper limit on 
earnings that is applied in most social contribution systems. 
Benefits only make up a small part of disposable income; they are particularly low in Ireland 
and the UK. Naturally, means-tested benefits are low. But they are not entirely absent, as 
means tests are usually applied to income of the couple or inner family rather than the 
household as a whole. Thus low income pensioners may receive means tested benefits while 
living in high income households. It is also striking that, except maybe for Austria, public 
pensions are far less important than for the other income groups (in Ireland and Denmark they 
are almost zero). This is consistent with studies that show how pensioners are 
underrepresented at the top of the income distribution (see e.g. Whitehouse, 2000). 
 
4.2 Income inequality and the redistributive effect of tax-benefit systems  
Clearly tax-benefit systems operate very differently for the rich and the poor across countries. 
In order to examine explicitly the redistributive effects of the systems as a whole, inequality 
levels before and after adding in taxes and benefits are shown in Figure 4 (and see Table 1). 
As explained in section 2, we use the standard Gini coefficient to measure inequality and this 
is plotted for three different income concepts: market income, market plus public pension 
income and disposable income. Countries are ranked by market income inequality. 
Confidence intervals, calculated using bootstrap techniques are also shown.
13 The differences 
between the square and circle shaped markers show the reduction in inequality that arises 
once public pensions are added to market income.  
This is a graphical representation of calculating the redistributive effect as the difference 
between GX  and GX+TB. The redistributive effect of all instruments, where X is market income 
and TB is the sum of all taxes and benefits, is given by the distance between the markers for 
market income and disposable income on Figure 4. The effect of all instruments except public 
                                                           
12  In fact, 0.3% for both taxes and contributions. 
13 In most individual countries 1000 replications were used; for the EU-15 as a whole 100 replications were 
carried out.  
  9pensions (i.e. X = market and public pension income, and TB = all taxes and benefits except 
public pensions) is given by the distance between the circle- and dot- shaped markers on 
Figure 4. An alternative picture is provided in Figure 5 which expresses the redistributive 
effect as a percentage of GX in order to take account of country differences in the levels of 
market income inequality. In Figure 5 countries are ranked from high to low disposable 
income inequality. A third perspective is provided by Table 2 which shows the positions in 
the country ranking by level of inequality for the three measures of income.  
Looking first at the overall impact of the tax-benefit systems including public pensions on 
market income inequality, we can see that all systems reduce income inequality substantially, 
though to very different extents. This is illustrated by the fact that the difference between the 
lowest and the highest levels of inequality is smaller for market income (a difference of 0.108 
between the Gini coefficients for the Netherlands and Spain) than for disposable income (a 
difference of 0.125 between Austria and Portugal).  
The tax-benefit system is highly redistributive in Finland, Denmark, Belgium, Austria, 
Luxembourg and Germany (RE of 45% or more relative to market income inequality – shown 
by the darker bars in Figure 5). These are also the countries with the lowest levels of 
disposable income inequality. Greece, Italy and Portugal on the other hand have a low degree 
of redistribution (RE of about 30% of market income inequality), and are the countries with 
the highest inequality of disposable incomes. France, Sweden, the Netherlands, Ireland, UK 
and Spain form a middle group in terms of the extent of redistribution, although the 
Netherlands starts with the lowest market income inequality and Spain starts with the highest 
market income inequality. The observation that countries with relatively equal distributions of 
disposable incomes tend to exhibit the largest redistributive effects illustrates the importance 
of redistributive mechanisms built into tax-benefit systems. 
14 
The size of the redistributive effect is highly sensitive to whether public pensions are included 
as part of the redistributive system. Pensions play a particularly important role in reducing 
market income inequality in Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, France and Spain and a 
particularly minor role in Ireland the UK and to a lesser extent, Denmark. The ranking of the 
amount of redistribution achieved is therefore somewhat altered if public pensions are 
considered as part of market income and not part of the redistributive system. Belgium, 
Denmark and Finland remain in the group of the three most redistributive countries (RE of 
36% or more), and Austria, Germany and Luxembourg now form an “upper-middle” group 
(with RE between 30% and 36%) along with three of the countries that are classified as 
middle-ranking when pensions are included in the redistributive system: Ireland, the 
Netherlands and the UK. Without public pensions the Spanish system is relatively less 
redistributive and joins the other southern countries in the low redistribution group (RE of 
under 25%). The remaining two countries – France and Sweden – achieve redistribution at an 
intermediate level between 25% and 30%. 
Taking the EU-15 countries as a whole, “European” market income inequality lies between 
that of the 5
th and 6
th most equal countries (Germany and Luxembourg) once national levels 
of income have been adjusted for purchasing power differences. The redistributive effect of 
the system as a whole is similar to that of the middle-ranking group of countries and if public 
pensions are not considered as part of the redistributive system, the equalising effect is lower, 
and commensurate with that of Spain.  
                                                           
14 To a degree this result also captures behavioural incentives associated with tax-benefit systems, where the 
presence of strong income replacement instruments can result in reduced labour supply by those with low 
earnings potential, and thus lower market income inequality. 
 
  10Comparison of the measures with these two income concepts indicates that the equalising 
effect of pensions varies greatly over countries. In Ireland and the UK it turns out to be very 
small, which, as we have seen, are also the countries with the lowest proportion of public 
pensions in household income (as shown in Figures 1 to 3). This distinction emphasises the 
fact that pensions are primarily provided through the private sector in Ireland and the UK. 
Unsurprisingly, in countries where the state is a more important provider of retirement 
incomes, public pensions are more effective at reducing income disparities. Clearly, the 
accounting period is highly relevant here. Even if there was no inter-personal redistribution in 
state pensions over the lifetime at all (so that they would be equivalent to unsubsidised private 
pensions), pensions would appear highly redistributive in a cross-sectional perspective as they 
are often the main income source for the elderly.
15  
 
4.3.  Redistributive effects of individual policy measures 
In a similar way we now calculate the redistributive effect of each component of the tax-
benefit systems separately. Thus X becomes market income including all taxes and benefits 
except the instrument concerned, i.e. in turn, non means-tested benefits (not including public 
pensions), means-tested benefits, social contributions and income taxes. As explained in 
Section 2 the question that we are asking is, starting from the situation without the instrument 
in question, how much is inequality reduced by introducing it? We ask this question for each 
of the four types of instrument in turn, and the results are shown in Figure 6 and, more 
detailed, in Table 3.
16 
Of these four instruments non means-tested benefits have a leading role in the redistributive 
process in almost all countries (and the EU-15 as a whole). Especially in the Scandinavian 
countries, Austria and Belgium these benefits have a very large equalising effect. In Ireland 
and the UK means-tested benefits are the most important redistributive instruments. The 
inequality reduction due to means-tested benefits is much smaller in all other countries 
although the redistributive effect can still be sizable and is larger than that of income taxes in 
France and Sweden. 
Social insurance contributions have relatively the weakest redistributive power, as in most 
countries they are levied on a more or less proportional base, at least within the most relevant 
parts of the earnings distribution.  
The contribution of income taxes to inequality reduction is relatively high in the countries 
with the most equal distributions of disposable incomes (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), and also in Ireland and Spain. It is interesting to 
relate these results to the relative importance of income taxes shown in Figure 1. Income tax 
burdens are high in Belgium, Denmark and Finland. Given the size of the tax burdens in these 
countries there is therefore considerable potential to alter the distribution of incomes and a 
progressive income tax will therefore tend to be highly redistributive. Yet Figure 6 also shows 
that the other countries with a highly redistributive income tax achieve a similar reduction of 
the Gini coefficient despite much lower income tax burdens, indicating a higher degree of tax 
                                                           
15 Even when measured over the lifetime, public pensions tend to exhibit considerable inter-personal 
redistribution as a result of widely-used design features such as minimum pension guarantees and benefit 
ceilings in earnings-related pension schemes. 
16 Note that, using this approach, the sizes of the effects shown in Figure 6 do not sum to the overall RE shown in 
Figure 5. 
  11progressivity in these countries.
17 A moderate degree of redistribution through income taxes is 
achieved in Greece, Portugal and the UK (in Portugal income taxes are nevertheless the most 
redistributive of all instruments). The redistributive effect of taxes is rather low in Italy, 
France and – despite large tax burdens – Sweden.
18 
Summarising, we find that countries with a relatively low level of disposable income 
inequality, are characterised by a high redistributive effect of both non means-tested benefits 
and income taxes. Countries with a relatively high level of disposable income inequality 
either show a low redistributive effect for all instruments (as is the case for Southern Europe) 
or a high redistributive effect for means-tested benefits only (Ireland and UK). 
 
5.   Conclusions 
The variation in size and structure of direct taxes and cash benefits in the Member States of 
the European Union is one of the prime determinants of differences in income inequality 
across countries. In this paper we have investigated the role of different components of tax-
benefit systems in the cross-sectional inequality of disposable household income. Unlike 
many other international studies the analysis encompasses both direct taxes and cash benefits, 
and it covers all 15 ‘old’ member countries of the EU in a manner that provides results which 
are conceptually consistent and comparable across countries. A microsimulation approach is 
employed, which allows some of the measurement problems normally encountered in 
comparative research on income inequality to be addressed. The most obvious advantage is 
that this approach permits an analysis of taxes and benefits based on datasets that do not 
provide information on these variables at all, or not with the desired level of detail. More 
generally, it makes the analysis of taxes and benefits less dependent on the precise definition 
of these variables in the underlying data and differences in the definitions across countries. By 
ensuring a consistent application of the legal rules governing tax liabilities and benefit 
entitlements across countries, the resulting tax and benefit amounts are potentially more 
comparable than tax and benefit variables recorded in the original micro-data sources. 
Furthermore, the simulation approach provides greater analytical flexibility as it allows sub-
categories of taxes and benefits to be defined consistently across countries and independently 
of definitions adopted by the data providers. Thus analytical choices are not simply driven by 
data availability. In this study we explore separately the effects of income taxes, social 
contributions, public pensions and other non means-tested and means-tested benefits. Finally, 
the generation of results at the micro-level for all 15 countries allows inequality measures to 
be reported for the EU-15 as a whole as well as for each country.  
For the EU-15 as a whole the Gini coefficient for market income (0.47) is similar to that of 
Belgium, Finland, Germany or Luxembourg. Public pensions reduce this to 0.41 while the 
redistribution achieved by all tax and benefit components taken together reduces the European 
Gini to 0.30 – a degree of inequality that falls in-between that observed in France and the UK. 
The overall redistributive effect is in absolute terms of similar size to that in the Netherlands 
                                                           
17 An analysis of the individual driving factors of the redistributive effect (size of the tax or benefit instrument, 
progressivity and re-ranking effect) in European tax-benefit systems is the subject of follow-up work to the 
present paper.  
18 The division of countries in high, moderate and low redistributive effect through taxes is close but not 
identical to that found by Verbist (2004) who also uses EUROMOD: the high RE countries are Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany and Luxembourg; the group with a moderate RE consists of Ireland, Netherlands, 
Portugal, UK; and those with a low RE are France, Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden. This study investigates the 
effect of taxes and contributions in combination, rather than separately. 
  12and the UK and in relative terms (taking account of the starting level of market inequality) 
closest to that of Spain.  
Countries that achieve a high level of inequality reduction through their tax-benefit system do 
this mainly by using non means-tested benefits and taxes; this is the case for the Scandinavian 
countries and most of the continental welfare states. A low degree of redistribution is 
achieved in Southern Europe, except in the case of Spain if pensions are considered as part of 
the redistributive system. The redistributive effect of taxes and transfers is somewhat higher 
in Ireland and the UK, who mainly rely on means-tested benefits. 
Pensions can be considered as a redistributive instrument between individuals at a point in 
time or as a means of saving by a single individual over time. Both aspects are present to 
some extent in all pension systems. While it is not possible to distinguish the savings function 
of pensions from the redistributive, we have shown that the equalising effect of public 
pensions within a particular year is rather small in Ireland and the UK, where pensions are 
primarily provided through the private sector. In all other countries, however, our results 
show that state pensions have a strong equalising effect, which justifies some consideration of 
their redistributive role at a moment in time. 
The analysis presented here raises questions to be explored in further work. First of all, we 
have relied on the standard Gini coefficient to measure inequality. Other measures, with 
different sets of welfare preferences embodied in them, could result in different rankings of 
countries. Secondly, we have focussed on the redistributive, or equalising, properties of taxes 
and benefits without investigating the extent to which the size and design of the instruments 
play a role. Unpacking the redistributive effect into components corresponding to the 
progressivity of the instrument, the size of the instrument and the extent of re-ranking when 
the instrument is applied, would inform our understanding of how and why some systems are 
more equalising than others. Finally, the key equalising role of non means-tested benefits in 
many systems deserves further investigation. Non means-tested benefits consist mainly of 
unemployment benefits, pensions paid to the non-elderly and universal benefits (mainly child 
benefits) in most countries. It would be interesting to further “dissect” this group of benefits, 
as their distributional characteristics are likely to be different and to vary among countries.  
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  15Figure 1: Income composition 1998: all households 
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Source: EUROMOD (See http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod/emodstats/index.php)  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Income composition 1998: bottom quintile 
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Source: EUROMOD (See http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod/emodstats/index.php)  
 
 
  16Figure 3: Income composition 1998: top quintile 
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Source: EUROMOD (See http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod/emodstats/index.php)  
 
 
Figure 4: Income inequality 1998 (Gini coefficient) 
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Source: EUROMOD Countries are ranked by market income inequality 
Note: The statistical reliability of the estimates is shown using confidence intervals that have been constructed to 
be significant at the 5% level: i.e.+/- 1.96 * estimated standard error. 
  17Figure 5: Redistributive effect of tax-benefit systems 1998 (% change in Gini) 
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Figure 6: Redistributive effect of tax-benefit instruments 1998 (change in Gini) 
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  18Table 1: Gini coefficients for market income, market income including public pensions and disposable 
income, 1998 
 
 
  Market income 
 
Market income + public 
pensions 
 
Disposable income 
 
      Confidence interval    Confidence interval    Confidence interval 
      min max    min max    min max 
Austria  AT  0.441  0.431 0.450 0.353  0.345 0.361 0.233  0.227 0.239 
Belgium  BE  0.462  0.452 0.473 0.399  0.389 0.409 0.250  0.241 0.258 
Denmark  DK  0.457  0.442 0.471 0.400  0.387 0.414 0.235  0.225 0.245 
Finland  FI  0.482  0.474 0.489 0.400  0.393 0.407 0.246  0.240 0.252 
France  FR  0.486  0.480 0.492 0.402  0.397 0.408 0.287  0.283 0.291 
Germany  GE  0.470  0.461 0.479 0.383  0.375 0.391 0.259  0.253 0.264 
Greece  GR  0.484  0.478 0.491 0.408  0.402 0.414 0.336  0.332 0.341 
Ireland  IR  0.516  0.507 0.525 0.495  0.486 0.504 0.324  0.316 0.331 
Italy  IT  0.497  0.490 0.504 0.434  0.427 0.440 0.352  0.347 0.358 
Luxembourg  LU  0.481  0.470 0.491 0.396  0.386 0.405 0.256  0.250 0.263 
Netherlands  NL  0.412  0.404 0.420 0.362  0.354 0.370 0.250  0.245 0.255 
Portugal  PT  0.514  0.504 0.524 0.457  0.447 0.466 0.358  0.349 0.366 
Spain  SP  0.520  0.514 0.526 0.433  0.427 0.438 0.328  0.323 0.332 
Sweden  SW  0.501  0.493 0.508 0.423  0.416 0.430 0.299  0.289 0.309 
United Kingdom  UK  0.502  0.496 0.508 0.464  0.458 0.469 0.313  0.309 0.317 
  EU15  0.473  0.471 0.476 0.409  0.406 0.412 0.300  0.299 0.302 
 
Source: EUROMOD  
Note: The statistical reliability of the estimates is shown using confidence intervals that have been constructed to 
be significant at the 5% level: i.e.+/- 1.96 * estimated standard error. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Inequality ranking of countries for market income and disposable income, 1998 
 (lower ranks have higher inequality) 
 
  AT  BE DK FI FR GE GR IR IT LU NL  PT  SP  SW  UK
market income (1a)  14  12  13 9  7 11 8  2  6 10  15 3  1  5  4 
market income + pensions (1b)  15  11 9 10 8 13 7  1  4 12  14 3  5  6  2 
disposable income (2)  15  12  14  13  8 9 3 5 2  10  11  1 4 7 6 
re-ranking (1a) - (2)  1↓  ↔  1↓ 4 ↓ 1 ↓ 2 ↑ 5 ↑ 3 ↓ 4 ↑  ↔  4↑ 2 ↑ 3 ↓ 2 ↓ 2 ↓ 
re-ranking (1b) - (2)  ↔  1↓ 5 ↓ 3 ↓  ↔  4↑ 4 ↑ 4 ↓ 2 ↑ 2 ↑ 3 ↑ 2 ↑ 1 ↑ 1 ↓ 4 ↓ 
 
Source: EUROMOD 
Note: the first three rows show the position of each country in the ranking by inequality (Gini coefficient) using 
three measures of income and with the lowest rank indicating the highest inequality. The last two rows indicate 
with arrows the direction of movement in the country ranking when comparing the ranks under the two 
alternative market income measures with that for disposable income.
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AT  0.233 0.359 0.331 0.318 0.243 0.245 0.283 
ci  0.230 0.236 0.353 0.365 0.326 0.335 0.313 0.322 0.240 0.246 0.242 0.248 0.279 0.286 
BE  0.250 0.344 0.360 0.343 0.263 0.263 0.317 
ci  0.245 0.254 0.339 0.350 0.355 0.365 0.338 0.349 0.259 0.268 0.259 0.267 0.312 0.322 
DK  0.235 0.324 0.414 0.380 0.259 0.253 0.293 
ci  0.230 0.240 0.318 0.331 0.407 0.420 0.374 0.386 0.254 0.265 0.248 0.258 0.287 0.300 
FI  0.246 0.366 0.402 0.371 0.270 0.255 0.294 
ci  0.243 0.249 0.361 0.370 0.398 0.406 0.367 0.375 0.267 0.273 0.252 0.258 0.291 0.297 
FR  0.287 0.389 0.390 0.356 0.316 0.302 0.309 
ci  0.285 0.289 0.386 0.391 0.388 0.392 0.354 0.359 0.314 0.318 0.300 0.304 0.306 0.312 
GE  0.259 0.362 0.349 0.338 0.268 0.264 0.313 
ci  0.256 0.262 0.358 0.366 0.345 0.353 0.334 0.341 0.265 0.271 0.261 0.266 0.309 0.317 
GR  0.336 0.423 0.384 0.380 0.339 0.337 0.372 
ci  0.334 0.339 0.420 0.426 0.381 0.386 0.377 0.383 0.337 0.342 0.335 0.340 0.369 0.375 
IR  0.324 0.346 0.463 0.358 0.423 0.331 0.371 
ci  0.320 0.327 0.342 0.350 0.459 0.468 0.354 0.362 0.419 0.427 0.327 0.334 0.367 0.376 
IT  0.352 0.430 0.419 0.406 0.364 0.357 0.382 
ci  0.349 0.355 0.426 0.433 0.416 0.422 0.403 0.409 0.361 0.367 0.354 0.360 0.379 0.385 
LU  0.256 0.365 0.351 0.335 0.269 0.262 0.319 
ci  0.253 0.260 0.360 0.370 0.347 0.355 0.331 0.339 0.266 0.273 0.259 0.265 0.314 0.324 
NL  0.250 0.311 0.352 0.323 0.276 0.255 0.300 
ci  0.247 0.252 0.308 0.315 0.348 0.356 0.319 0.326 0.273 0.279 0.253 0.258 0.296 0.304 
PT  0.358 0.420 0.416 0.396 0.377 0.366 0.401 
ci  0.353 0.362 0.415 0.424 0.412 0.421 0.391 0.400 0.373 0.381 0.362 0.370 0.397 0.406 
SP  0.328 0.426 0.400 0.386 0.341 0.328 0.374 
ci  0.325 0.330 0.423 0.429 0.398 0.403 0.383 0.388 0.339 0.344 0.326 0.330 0.371 0.377 
SW  0.299 0.427 0.458 0.415 0.336 0.301 0.326 
ci  0.294 0.304 0.422 0.432 0.454 0.463 0.409 0.420 0.331 0.340 0.296 0.305 0.322 0.330 
UK  0.313 0.354 0.448 0.356 0.395 0.321 0.347 
ci  0.310 0.315 0.352 0.357 0.445 0.451 0.353 0.358 0.392 0.397 0.319 0.323 0.345 0.350 
EU15  0.300 0.376 0.388 0.358 0.327 0.312 0.338 
ci  0.299 0.301 0.374 0.377 0.387 0.390 0.357 0.359 0.326 0.328 0.311 0.313 0.337 0.339 
 
Source: EUROMOD 
Note: The statistical reliability of the estimates is shown using confidence intervals that have been constructed to 
be significant at the 5% level: i.e.+/- 1.96 * estimated standard error.. 
  20Annex A: EUROMOD source data. 
 
Country  Base Dataset for EUROMOD  Date of collection  Reference time period for incomes 
Austria  Austrian version of European Community Household Panel  1998+1999  annual 1998 
Belgium  Panel Survey on Belgian Households  1999  annual 1998 
Denmark  European Community Household Panel  1995  annual 1994 
Finland  Income distribution survey   1998  annual 1998 
France  Budget de Famille  1994/5  annual 1993/4 
Germany  German Socio-Economic Panel  1998  annual 1997 
Greece  European Community Household Panel   1995  annual 1994 
Ireland  Living in Ireland Survey   1994  month in 1994 
Italy  Survey of Households Income and Wealth   1996  annual 1995 
Luxembourg  PSELL-2   1999  annual 1998 
Netherlands  Sociaal-economisch panelonderzoek   1996  annual 1995 
Portugal  European Community Household Panel   1996  annual 1995 
Spain  European Community Household Panel   1996  annual 1995 
Sweden  Income distribution survey   1997  annual 1997 
UK  Family Expenditure Survey   1995/6  month in 1995/6 
  21Annex B: Categorisation of public pension and means-tested benefit income components 
In this appendix we explain which variables are included in our concepts of pension incomes 
and means tested benefits and discuss the issues to be considered in such classifications. 
 
Pension Incomes 
Our understanding of pension income can be roughly defined as state enforced savings. This 
includes however not only the classical form of social insurance pensions but also general tax 
financed pension schemes, like for example the Danish old-age pension, received by almost 
all Danes reaching the age of 67 (lowered to 65 in 2004).  
We do not consider means tested old age schemes as pensions, unless they are an integral part 
of the pension system. If low pensions are topped up to reach a certain minimum, we count 
these supplements as pension income. This distinction can be somewhat arbitrary in practice. 
Other means-tested schemes for the elderly are included as means-tested benefits (see below). 
As in some countries early retirement pensions are used as a substitute for unemployment 
benefits we restrict our pension definition to retirement benefits granted to people aged 65 or 
older. In the same sense, invalidity pensions are not included in the pensions measure, as they 
are state insurance for another "risks" than old age. On the other hand we include non means 
tested survivor's pensions (for those aged 65+). Where invalidity pensions are paid instead of 
retirement pensions to people aged 65 or more, these are treated as pension income.  
Finally, some non-pension benefits apply specific rules to the elderly. For example, rules are 
different for the elderly in Finnish and Danish housing benefits. Such benefits are not 
included in the pensions category. 
The income components included for each country as pensions are listed below:  
 
AUSTRIA 
• minimum pension  
• minimum pension for civil servants  
• child bonus for pensioners  
• child bonus for civil service pensioners  
• civil servant's pension  
• early retirement pension invalidity 
pension  
• old age pension 
• other old age related schemes or 
benefits 
• survivor pension 
 
BELGIUM 
• anticipated pension 
• other public pensions 
• retirement pension 
• survivor pension 
 
 
DENMARK 
• disability pension - basic amount 
plus supplement 
• disability pension - special 
supplement plus incapacity amount 
• disability pension - invalidity 
amount plus 'augmentation' plus 
special benefit for disabled with 
substantial earnings 
• old age pension 
• supplementary pension 
• survivor pension 
FINLAND 
• gross state pension income * 
• national (basic) pension increases 
 
FRANCE 
• minimum old age 
pension 
• pension benefits 
• alimony 
• pre-retirement pension 
 
GERMANY 
• own old age pension 
• miners' own pension 
• civil servants' own pension 
• farmers' own pension 
• widow/orphan old-age pension 
• miners' widow/orphan pension 
• civil servants' widow/orphan 
pension 
• farmers' widow/orphan pension 
• accident widow/orphan pension 
  22GREECE 
• farmers' pension 
• social solidarity benefit 
• state pension 
• invalidity pension (contributory) 
• state survivor's pension 
 
IRELAND 
• deserted wife 
contributory benefits 
• occupational injury 
contributory pension 
• old age contributory 
benefits 
• retirement contributory 
benefits 
• survivor's contributory 
benefits 
ITALY 
• public and private sector old age 
contributory pensions  
• public and private sector 
contributory disability pensions 
• public and private sector 
contributory survivor’s pensions  
• supplement paid on old age 
pensions – public and private sector 
• supplement paid on disability 
pensions – public and private sector 
• supplement paid on survivor’s  
pensions – public and private sector 
• foreign pension 
LUXEMBOURG 
• disability pension 
• early retirement pension 
• pension received from employment in 
private sector 
• pension received from employment in 
public sector 
• private sector reversion pension 
• public sector reversion pension 
NETHERLANDS 
• state pension 
• survivors' benefit  
 
PORTUGAL 
• old-age insurance 
• old-age agricultural.insurance  
• survivors related benefits 
 
SPAIN 
• old age pension supplement 
• widow pension supplement 
• old-age (insurance and early retirement) 
• survivors (widows or orphans, 
insurance) 
SWEDEN 
• non-taxable pension 
• other taxable pensions 
 
 
UK 
• widow benefit 
• basic retirement pension 
• state earnings related pension 
 
* includes some occupational pension income. 
 
 
 
Means Tested Benefits 
 
Our definition of means tested benefits is intended to cover all benefits that depend on an 
assessment of current income. It includes all benefits with an earnings or income test, even if 
the limit does not confine entitlement to the poor or near-poor. Thus it includes “affluence-
tested” benefits as well as those targeted on the lowest incomes. Similarly, benefits that are 
more generous to people with low income than to people with high income are included in the 
means tested category, even if the “rich” are in principle eligible for some amount. So benefits 
with non means tested basic amounts plus means tested supplements are defined here as 
means-tested. In practice the distinction can be rather arbitrary since there are examples of 
benefits that are essentially universal, with relatively small means-tested top-ups. Or benefits 
that apply in a similar way to different groups with means-testing only operating in some 
variants (the Belgian child benefit is an example). The list below shows the benefits that are 
considered as means tested for each country in this study: 
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AUSTRIA 
• maternity allowance supplement 
• new born health check bonus 
• provincial family bonus 
• social assistance 
• small children benefit  
• unemployment benefit  
• housing benefits  
BELGIUM 
• income support  
• income support for the elderly  
 
DENMARK 
• housing benefit 
• day care subsidy 
• housing allowance 
• social assistance 
 
FINLAND 
• housing benefit 
• home child care benefit 
• social assistance benefit 
• pensioners housing benefit 
 
FRANCE 
• disabled benefit  
• young children allowance  
• education related family benefits  
• family complement  
• housing benefits  
• lone parent benefit  
• minimum income  
GERMANY 
• housing benefit 
• federal child raising 
benefit  
• direct housing 
support 
• provincial child 
raising benefit  
• social assistance 
GREECE 
• child allowance 
• large family benefit 
• third child benefit 
• unprotected child benefit 
• social pension 
IRELAND 
• housing benefit 
• blind persons non-contributory benefits 
• carer's non-contributory benefits 
• short term disabled contributory benefits 
• long term disabled non-contributory benefits 
• deserted wives non-contributory benefits 
• family income supplement 
• long term invalidity contributory benefits 
• lone parent non-contributory benefits 
• long term unemployed non-contributory benefits 
• old age non-contributory benefits 
• pre-retirement non-contributory benefits 
• short term unemployed non-contributory benefits 
• social minimum non-contributory benefits 
• widow's non-contributory benefits 
ITALY 
• family allowances 
for single persons 
with no children 
• family allowances 
for single person 
with children 
• family allowances 
for couples with no 
children 
• family allowances 
for couples with 
children 
 
LUXEMBOURG 
• education allowance 
• housing benefit 
• maternity allowance 
• social assistance  
 
NETHERLANDS 
• housing benefit 
• social assistance for unemployed aged 50-64 and 
disabled unemployed under 64 with children 
• general social assistance for families with children 
• social assistance for unemployed aged 50-64 and 
disabled unemployed under 64 without children 
• general social assistance for families w/o children 
• general social assistance, self-employed 
PORTUGAL 
• child benefits 
• income supplement 
to ensure minimum 
income 
• social assistance 
 
SPAIN 
• child benefit  
• old age social assistance  
• unemployed social assistance for 
those with family responsibility 
• social assistance benefits  
SWEDEN 
• housing benefits 
• housing benefit supplement for pensioners 
• social assistance 
 
UK 
• housing benefit 
• council tax benefit 
• family credit 
• income support 
 
 
  24About ENEPRI 
he European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI) is composed of leading 
socio-economic research institutes in practically all EU member states and candidate countries that 
are committed to working together to develop and consolidate a European agenda of research. 
ENEPRI was launched in 2000 by the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), which 
provides overall coordination for the initiative.  
While the European construction has made gigantic steps forward in the recent past, the European 
dimension of research seems to have been overlooked. The provision of economic analysis at the 
European level, however, is a fundamental prerequisite to the successful understanding of the 
achievements and challenges that lie ahead. ENEPRI aims to fill this gap by pooling the research efforts 
of its different member institutes in their respective areas of specialisation and to encourage an explicit 
European-wide approach. 
 
ENEPRI is composed of the following member institutes: 
CASE  Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Poland 
CEE  Center for Economics and Econometrics, Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey 
CEPII  Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, Paris, France 
CEPS  Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Belgium 
CERGE-EI  Centre for Economic Research and Graduated Education, Charles University, Prague, 
Czech Republic 
CPB  Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague, The Netherlands 
DIW  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin, Germany 
ESRI  Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
ETLA  Research Institute for the Finnish Economy, Helsinki, Finland 
FEDEA  Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada, Madrid, Spain 
FPB  Federal Planning Bureau, Brussels, Belgium 
IE-BAS  Institute of Economics, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria 
IER  Institute for Economic Research, Bratislava, Slovakia 
IER  Institute for Economic Research, Ljubljana, Slovenia 
IHS  Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria 
ISAE  Istituto di Studi e Analisi Economica, Rome, Italy 
NIER  National Institute of Economic Research, Stockholm, Sweden 
NIESR  National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London, UK 
NOBE  Niezalezny Osrodek Bana Ekonomicznych, Lodz, Poland 
PRAXIS  Center for Policy Studies, Tallinn, Estonia 
RCEP  Romanian Centre for Economic Policies, Bucharest, Romania 
SSB    Research Department, Statistics Norway, Oslo, Norway 
SFI    Danish National Institute of Social Research, Copenhagen, Denmark 
TÁRKI  Social Research Centre Inc., Budapest, Hungary 
 
ENEPRI  publications include three series: Research Reports, which consist of papers presenting the 
findings and conclusions of research undertaken in the context of ENEPRI research projects; Working 
Papers, which constitute dissemination to a wider public of research undertaken and already published by 
ENEPRI partner institutes on their own account; and thirdly, Occasional Papers (closed series) containing 
a synthesis of the research presented at workshops organised during the first years of the network’s 
existence. 
 
European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes 
c/o Centre for European Policy Studies 
Place du Congrès 1 ▪ 1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: 32(0) 229.39.11 ▪ Fax: 32(0) 219.41.51 
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